Farming Through Brexit: How will leaving the EU affect farmers in and around the South Downs National Park?

photo of Helena Howe

Helena Howe

In this piece Dr Helena Howe (Lecturer in Law at the University of Sussex) gives snapshot findings from a pilot study of how the UK leaving the EU will affect Sussex farmers. In addition to outlining findings, Helena sets out potential policy implications of the research, as well as next steps for the project.

Initial snapshot of findings from pilot study

WHAT IS THE STUDY AND WHO IS INVOLVED?

In a way this project started in 2016, just after the vote to leave had been announced. I stood at the base of the Downs talking to a farmer who has worked hard to enhance the wildlife on the farm and is justly proud of his farmland bird populations. But his vision of the future was not a comfortable one. If food prices fell and financial support for farming reduced significantly, he feared being left with no choice but to squeeze every ounce of productivity out of the farm; thereby squeezing out the wildlife. A well-designed and funded system of support for farmers and land managers could do much to address the flaws in the existing approaches, buffer uncertain markets and foster sustainable food production in the UK. But the risks of getting it wrong were evident.

Withdrawal from the EU and the Common Agricultural Policy is likely to have significant impacts on farmers in the UK. The Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) is currently developing the new regulatory framework for land management, including the proposed Environmental Land Management Scheme (ELMS) to deliver ‘public payment for public goods’, although there is ongoing uncertainty due to the election and Brexit process.

This is the first stage of a study following a dozen farmers in and around the South Downs National Park until 2024. The aim is to contribute an in-depth, regional exploration of farmers’ lived experience of farming as we leave the EU and their responses to the emerging post-Brexit law and policy.

The research began with this pilot study of six farmers in the Eastern South Downs. The farms involved differ in terms of output, approach and tenure. Four of the farms were described as conventional or commercial, one is organic dairy and another has sustainability firmly integrated with food production. There is a mix of owner-occupiers and tenants.

The farmers were interviewed during summer 2019 and asked for their views on:

  1. the impact of Brexit on their farm business, including the changes to existing payment schemes;
  2. whether the potential changes to their markets and the introduction of the Environmental Land Management Scheme (ELMS) were likely to alter the way they farm;
  3. features of the proposed ELMS and opportunities for participation in the process of development;
  4. any other issue they felt important.

 

WHAT ARE THE INITIAL FINDINGS?

1. Potential impact on the farm business

All the farmers felt uncertainty about the future. Several were extremely concerned about the financial viability of their farms post-Brexit given the lack of information on market conditions – particularly tariffs, food standards and distribution channels – as well as payment schemes. Most felt that without either higher food prices or substantial public good payments their farm business would be in a precarious financial position. One noted that their farms and other risked ‘going bankrupt wholesale’ (Farmer A). Most already relied on diversification to support the farm financially, although several questioned why the return on food production was so low as to make diversification necessary.

For most, removal of income support through Direct Payments and lack of detail around the new ELMS was a major concern. The majority felt that the loss of Direct Payments could be mitigated if payments for ‘public goods’ under the new ELMS were set at a suitably high level. However, most of the group acknowledged the problems with an area-based payment to landowners, particularly the impacts on land prices and rent. Several noted that the position was more challenging for tenant farmers than owner-occupied farms. Some also expressed concern for the new generation entering the sector.

Farming in this region was seen as a mixed blessing. Those who farmed in the South Downs National Park felt that this was a potential benefit under a system of payments for the provision of public goods. Several farmers were critical of the South Downs National Park Authority management of issues, particularly in relation to recreational access and planning.

2. Changes to farming focus and practice

For all but two of the farmers producing food was the priority. Two of the participants felt that food production was vital but more integrated with wider environmental and social goals. All the farmers were aware of the potential impact of their practices on the environment, both positive and negative. Several felt the degree of damage done by farming to the environment was mispresented.

The majority of participants appeared pragmatic about what they would produce and how they would manage their land and livestock in the future. As one farmer stated: ‘…if I need to change something because that’s where the money is, then that’s what I have to do’ (Farmer B). Decisions on what to produce and how they produced it would be largely determined by what was required by the market or any payment schemes. One spoke of willingness to produce wildlife if that was what became financially sensible. However, another was prepared to become more intensive if this was the only way to maintain the viability of the farm, against his personal preference. Another two felt they could accept a system in which conservation was integrated into food production but would not prioritise public goods over food.

The other two were less pragmatic. They felt that their commitment to broader principles of sustainability meant that they would not be willing to intensify if it meant seriously compromising these principles.

A recurring theme was that the costs of producing food were not adequately recognised or reflected in the prices consumers expect to pay. Several farmers noted that income support through Direct Payments to farmers worked to subsidize cheaper food. The loss of these payments and low returns on food mean farmers are being asked to absorb this cost unfairly; in effect being asked to produce public goods – in the form of cheap food – without this being acknowledged or paid for. They felt this was a major issue for them and for the future of the sector.

3. Initial responses to ELMS

There was enormous frustration at how inflexible and prescriptive the existing agri-environment schemes (AES) have been in setting and enforcing objectives. Many felt that there was insufficient account taken of farmers’ knowledge of their farm and that enforcement was unduly harsh.

All felt that to be successful the new scheme must address these issues. Recommendations included:

  • a move to a more outcome- based system: ‘so what they need to do is to put it in our hands and say … “you deliver this and we want to see results”’ (Farmer E);
  • greater flexibility to enable farmers to try different approaches without being penalised;
  • regional implementation and support for ‘sensible’, knowledgeable, local advisors to help co-design a plan for the farm and to monitor achievement.

For one famer the scheme was simply flawed because it focuses on environmental goods and ignores food production.

Four of the six farmers are part of the same farming cluster. Some found the experience useful for peer learning and social interaction but others seemed unsure as to their real value or purpose. The importance of having a good facilitator was mentioned by several participants. There was ambivalence about an enhanced role for clusters under the new ELMS system amongst this group. Some recognised that this could help to provide public goods at the landscape level but were concerned about how this could work in practice. Several farmers stated that everyone wants to do their own thing on their own farm and not be tied into a scheme with other farms.

All but one farmer felt that they had not been enabled to participate in the development of the new scheme sufficiently. Some felt that that their views had not been sought, save via online consultation or by bodies such as the National Farmers Union (NFU) and the Country Land and Business Association (CLA). But many also felt they had not been – or would not be – listened to. One farmer mentioned that the South Downs National Park Authority has played a role in feeding their views back to DEFRA. Several famers felt that clusters should be used to feed farmers’ views into policymaking.

4. Additional issues

Several participants highlighted the challenges facing younger entrants into farming, such as access to available land – on which to both farm and live – as well as comparatively low levels of pay. Some linked this to the wider issue of how to support thriving rural communities through planning and communications policies. Others mentioned the move towards plant-based diets. Some noted the vital role of cattle and sheep farming in maintaining the Downs landscape but others were trying out products for the growing vegan market.

One farmer emphasised the role of farming in mitigating environmental and social crises through innovative sustainable practices and opportunities to provide experiences that educate and enhance well-being. He wanted farmers, schools and policymakers to embrace and support this vision.

 

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL POLICY ASPECTS FOR THE STUDY TO EXPLORE?

  • The funding and design of ELMS is potentially key to maintaining both viability of farms in the region and integration of environment and food production. The research will explore ELMS’ capacity to support farms in the South Downs to produce food alongside public goods.
  • If farmers are pragmatic and adaptable there are opportunities and risks for sustainability. Financial and other support could promote a resilient, sustainable farming sector but insufficient funding, excessive bureaucracy or delays could do the reverse. The challenge is to ensure that farmers adapt to changes in ways that promote ecological sustainability rather than being resilient by intensifying their food production. The study will help understand what farmers feel is needed to enable sustainable adaptations in farming practice.
  • Changes in the delivery of advice, monitoring and enforcement are likely to be key to helping farmers adapt to more sustainable practices and make the most of public funding under ELMS. A shift in the balance towards useful advice and away from inspections could significantly improve farmers’ experience of regulation and motivation to engage. The study will explore the role of advice, what makes valuable advisors and how they can enable farmers to make innovative and beneficial use of a more flexible and reward-based scheme.

    The experience of these farmers validates DEFRA’s aim to enhance flexibility and reward outcomes through ELMS. The research will help evaluate how well farmers feel the developing schemes meet these goals.

  • A role for clusters in the administration of ELMS appears challenging. The study will capture members’ experience of participation and suggestions for working at landscape scale.
  • Policymakers could increase efforts around effective participation in the design of ELMS. This study aims to monitor farmers’ perceptions of this and provide another path for feedback.

 

WHAT NEXT?

Discussion is underway with key policymakers and stakeholders to ensure the study is as useful as possible. Additional recruitment of participants in the project is also taking place.

Please contact: h.r.howe@sussex.ac.uk for further information or to get involved.

‘Seeing What is Invisible in Plain Sight’: How Effective Is the New Law on Coercive Control?

Cassandra Wiener

 

[Originally published by the Howard Journal of Crime and Justice’s Policy Insights blog. Republished with permission]

 

In early 2013, Rob Titchener, a tall, dark and handsome dairy farmer, arrived in Ambridge and started an affair with Helen Archer. And so began the controversial story line of the usually staid and very popular BBC Radio Four drama, ‘The Archers’, that ‘gripped the UK’ for three and a half years. The portrayal of Rob’s torturous coercive and controlling persecution of Helen culminated in a thrilling Sunday night ‘special episode’ in September 2016, as the programme was extended to an hour for the first time in its 65 year history. The dramatic conclusion prompted a fund-raising campaign that raised over £200,000 for domestic abuse charities, and even lead to a supportive statement from the Prime Minister’s Office. Public awareness of ‘coercive control’ as a new way of framing domestic abuse added momentum to a successful campaign for legal reform run by a coalition of women’s groups. In the afternoon of January 20th 2015, then Attorney General Robert Buckland introduced a new clause on coercive control into the Serious Crime Bill, which was the government’s major crime bill of 2014 – 2015. The Attorney General’s introduction to the committee on that afternoon was appropriately rousing: ‘abuse is hidden behind the closed doors of far too many families. We must bring domestic abuse out into the open if we are to end it. The first step is to call it what it is: a crime of the worst kind’.

Activists and front line specialists in the domestic abuse sector have long bemoaned what they see as a ‘gap’ between rhetorical intent and operational reality. Despite the Attorney General’s best intentions, the new clause ended up quietly tucked away as section 76 in Part V of the Serious Crime Act 2015 under the heading ‘Protection of Children and Others’. The poor drafting of section 76 is typical of the gap – relegating domestic abuse victims to the status of ‘Others’ is a significant step down from ‘calling it what it is’. However, while section 76 is imperfect, it is also both radical and progressive. When it came into force on 29 December 2015, England and Wales became the first jurisdiction in history to make ‘controlling or coercive behaviour’ a brand new criminal offence punishable by a maximum of five years in prison.

Domestic abuse is, unfortunately, qualitatively different as a crime in that perpetrators have 24/7 access to their victims. This makes it uniquely dangerous – recent BBC figures show that domestic homicide is at an all-time high: an unthinkable 173 people lost their lives last year at the hands of their partners or ex-partners. That there is a relationship between control and homicide is no longer in question. Criminal justice, in this context, is an essential tool for the front-line organisations who work to keep vulnerable women and children (it is almost always women who are the victims of coercive control) safe.

Four years on, there is a key question. Has section 76 helped the criminal justice system be more effective? Are the real-life Helen Titcheners – who live in what pioneering academic Professor Evan Stark has termed ‘a state of entrapment’ – any closer to freedom and/or safety? The future of Teresa May’s long awaited Domestic Violence and Abuse Bill is, at the time of writing, uncertain; if it does become law, it will introduce some important procedural changes, such as making it easier for victims to give evidence in court. None of these changes in themselves are likely have much of an impact on the most recent ONS figures, which show that there were only 235 successful coercive control prosecutions last year, in the context of an estimated 1.3 million women who experienced domestic abuse. However, a new paper in the Howard Journal of Crime and Justice suggests that the picture on the ground is more complicated. It also argues that urgent training is needed if section 76 is to reach its undoubtedly progressive potential.

Analysis of data from interviews and focus groups with survivors, their closest advisors, and police shows that section 76 has the potential to change the way the criminal justice system deals with domestic abuse radically and for the better. This will only be possible, however, if police, CPS and the judiciary are trained to understand the dynamics of coercive control. Last year, the World Health Organisation declared that domestic abuse is an international emergency. An approach to the prosecution of domestic abuse that is informed by the theory of coercive control could help keep women safe. Change is needed. Rhetorical intent in the context of domestic abuse is a good start. Compulsory training in coercive control for all key criminal justice agents would help make this intent an operational success story.

Cassandra Wiener is a doctoral researcher in the School of Law at the University of Sussex, and a Visiting Lecturer in Sociology at City, University of London. Her research focuses on coercive control and the criminal law and she advises governments and activists around the world on the doctrinal implications of domestic abuse law reform. Her monograph, Coercive Control and the Criminal Law, is being published by Routledge next year.

This blog is based on the following article: Seeing What is Invisible in Plain Sight: Policing Coercive Control, Cassandra Wiener. First published: 25 October 2017.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/hojo.12227

Reflecting on Research Collaboration: Before, During and After ‘Transformative Justice, Reparations and Transatlantic Slavery’

photo of Matthew Evans

Matthew Evans
School of Law, Politics and Sociology, University of Sussex, UK

David Wilkins
Wilberforce Institute, University of Hull, UK

[Reprinted with permission by the Social & Legal Studies Blog]

Recently, our co-authored article ‘Transformative Justice, Reparations and Transatlantic Slavery’ was published in the April 2019 print issue of Social & Legal Studies. The article had, however, been complete for some time and first appeared online in late 2017. Here we provide some reflections on how we came to write the article, what the article does and – especially – what we have been doing since its publication online and how this relates the themes and research underpinning the article.

What the article does and how we came to write it

The article began life in 2015 when both of us were postdoctoral fellows at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. David’s research up to that point had been focused on repairing the harms of transatlantic slavery and on mutual lessons from the histories of transatlantic slavery and South Africa. Matthew’s research had been focused on the roles of social movements, trade unions and nongovernmental organisations in networks working on socioeconomic rights-related issues, and on developing and applying the concept of transformative justice to the analysis of post-conflict and post-authoritarian contexts, focusing especially on post-apartheid South Africa. The article came out of bringing several of these areas of focus together.

In the article we consider lessons that debates surrounding transitional justice and transformative justice could offer to discussions regarding reparations for transatlantic slavery. We apply lessons from these debates to a consideration of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Ten-Point Plan for reparations, which, at the time we began working on the article, was relatively new and had begun to generate debate in scholarly and popular outlets. Offering a ‘supportive yet provocative critique’ of the CARICOM claim, we argue that that ‘reparations movements could strengthen their claims against wealthy and powerful actors by adopting a more radical, less limited approach to understanding, explaining and framing their claims’. In particular, we suggest that ‘[r]eparations movements need… to take account of the limitations and contradictions – as well as the potential – present in pursuing justice (in part at least) through reparations programmes’ and posit that ‘the specific injustice of transatlantic slavery requires acknowledgement and redress’, but that ‘this must be in addition to’, not ‘instead of, addressing current injustices which ultimately have complex roots (including but not limited to slavery)’.

To make our argument, the article draws on the literatures we had each been contending with in our research, and the debates in which we had been separately intervening. We draw upon Matthew’s work, which advances the argument first, that transformative justice ought to be considered separate to but overlapping with transitional justice Secondly, that it must take a longer-term view than transitional justice. And thirdly, that it must be oriented towards addressing structural violence and socioeconomic rights violations, rather than only the direct interpersonal violence and civil and political rights violations mainstream transitional justice has tended to be concerned with. We also draw upon David’s research highlighting the roles of history and truth telling in addressing the legacies of past injustices. This work led to David co-editing a special section of the South African Historical Journal on ‘Repairing the Legacies of Harm’ in 2017 and, in 2018, to publishing a chapter in Africa and its Diasporas: Rethinking Struggles for Recognition and Empowerment, edited by Behnaz A Mirzai and Bonny Ibhawoh.

Our article draws upon – and, we hope, contributes to – scholarship across a number of disciplines and fields: law, politics, history, human rights, memory studies (to name but a few). We hope that by bringing together these areas value has been added to debates about addressing historical wrongs, reparations, transitional justice and transformative justice. Moreover, we hope that the impact of our article, whether in our own ongoing work or in that of others, is not merely academic in the sense of being divorced from practical application.

What we did next

Since writing our co-authored article we have been working (separately) in areas which touch upon a number of the themes and issues we explored in the piece. Matthew’s research has continued to focus on human rights and related activism, and on theorising and applying transformative justice. In 2018 he published a monograph (Transformative Justice: Remedying Human Rights Violations Beyond Transition) focused on this, and in early 2019 he published a follow-up edited collection (Transitional and Transformative Justice: Critical and International Perspectives), to which David also contributed a chapter. David’s chapter builds upon several of the themes of our co-authored piece including:

  1. the importance of considering means of repairing historical wrongs beyond financial reparations;
  2. the possibility of lessons from transitional justice and transformative justice to be applied to injustices rooted in the deeper past than recent periods of conflict or authoritarianism;
  3. the importance of educational and cultural sites such as schools and museums for addressing injustices in society.

These themes are also present throughout David’s other recent works, such as his chapter in The Palgrave International Handbook of Human Trafficking (2019).

Moreover, David has taken his focus upon the possibilities for schools to act as sites of repair for historical injustices further than the recommendations made in the concluding remarks of scholarly papers. Whilst he continues to publish research, since 2017 he has been working as a secondary school teacher in history and religious studies. His research and teaching practice interact not least in how he has taught the history of transatlantic slavery to Key Stage Three students (those aged between 11 and 14), including encouraging students to research historical individuals frequently overlooked in schools, such as Toussaint L’Ouverture, and to question who gets to tell the stories about the past – and what impact this might have. What is more, having sought to conceptualise schools and museums as sites in which reparatory processes of historical truth telling could be facilitated through revised historical curricula, he has found it enlightening to spend time in schools and to become more informed as to the obstacles for schools to act in such a way. In particular, these obstacles include schools’ constrained funding (for new resources and the staff training which would, in many cases, be required) and the pressures that already exist for schools due to other existing demands on timetabling and curricula and exam directives.

What next?

Moving forward, we both have research plans which continue to address issues which we engage with in our co-authored article. David is working on a monograph which more fully sets out the research he has done on museums’ engagement with addressing the harmful histories and legacies of transatlantic slavery. He is also co-editing a volume exploring the nature of and changes in historical and contemporary slavery, and is increasingly interested in how the lessons of historical slavery and abolition can inform debates over contemporary forms of slavery and their eradication. Matthew is currently planning new research on the relationships between trade unions and human rights organisations as well as continuing research on transformative justice. Building on our interdisciplinary collaboration experience, he has also been developing work on interdisciplinarity and postdisciplinarity in rights and justice research.

 

This blog follows the publication of M. Evans and D. Wilkins, ‘Transformative Justice, Reparations and Transatlantic Slavery’ (2019) 28(2) Social & Legal Studies 137-157.  The paper is free-to-view for a limited time at the link below (correct at 03 June 2019)

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0964663917746490

 

Matthew Evans is a Teaching Fellow in the School of Law, Politics and Sociology, University of Sussex, UK and is a Visiting Researcher in the Department of Political Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. He completed his PhD at the Centre for Applied Human Rights, University of York, UK.

David Wilkins is a secondary school teacher and historian in Southend, Essex, UK and is affiliated with the Wilberforce Institute, University of Hull, UK. He has a PhD in Law from the University of Hull and was Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Heritage Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand from 2014-2016.

Judicial Independence – the view from Israel

aamir fuchs
Amir Paz-Fuchs

In May of last year, the President of the Israeli Supreme Court, Esther Hayut, delivered a remarkable speech, declaring that “Israel’s judicial branch is under an unprecedented attack that threatens to irreparably damage its independence”. The main cause for this extraordinary claim was an initiative to curtail the courts’ power to strike down laws that have an adverse, and disproportionate, impact on human rights. Speaking after President Hayut, Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked declared that it is Parliament’s duty to map the mutual relationship between the branches of government.

Not for the first time, the Israeli situation raises a number of interesting questions of general importance, for theoreticians and practitioners.

First, whilst I have zero sympathies with the politics of the Justice Minister, is she wrong to maintain that it is Parliament’s duty to map the relationship between the branches of government? After all, the nature of this relationship is the ultimate political question, in the true, unadulterated sense of the word. These are the questions that troubled Aristotle, Montesquieu and Madison. Why shouldn’t they be the subject of open debate within the most political of branches? Of course, the answer is that this very branch has skin in the game. How can it decide the extent of its own power, vis-à-vis other branches, in a manner that is intellectually honest? That is a fair objection, but it is not the one advanced by judges and their supporters. Indeed, every judiciary in the world owes at least some of its power to Parliament. Parliamentary acts tend to establish the courts, regulate their jurisdiction and determine the terms and conditions of the employment of the judges. So the argument is, to be precise, that a change to the status-quo, which changes the balance of power in a manner that is detrimental to the courts, is inherently threatening to judicial independence. But this is not only misguided. In being misguided, it also serves opponents of the courts with ammunition.

When the British courts were granted power, under the HRA 1998, to declare a law as incompatible with the European Convention of Human Rights, this did not increase their independence, but did give them powers that they didn’t have in the past. In contrast, the Israeli courts currently have far more powers than their British counterparts. So much so, in fact, that the most ‘extreme’ version of the current proposals debated, so extreme that it is not even considered seriously, is to adopt the British model, and allow the courts only to declare the unconstitutionality of a law. This proposal is perceived as a death knell to judicial independence. But does that mean that British courts do not enjoy judicial independence? That obviously is not the case. Similarly, if Israeli courts were to lose their existing powers to strike down laws, they would not lose judicial independence, but rather lose some judicial power.

Viewing it otherwise conflates two important, but separately important, issues.

The danger of conflation is evident, somewhat paradoxically, in President Hayut’s rebuke of the recent initiatives. In responding to the claim that the court is too powerful, she indicated that since 1992, the American Supreme Court voided 50 federal laws, while the Israeli court reached the same decision only on 18 occasions, making it one of the least ‘activist’ courts in the world. To paraphrase the President’s argument, perhaps unfairly, she is saying: we’re playing nice, so why are you picking on us? Even more unfairly, one may even find a normative element in her argument: if we promise to continue to ‘respect’ the decisions made by other branches of government, will you preserve our ‘judicial independence’? This is a dangerous path to follow. It is also somewhat paradoxical: for if the court has voided only 18 laws in 27 years, five of which involved two issues which reached the court on different occasions, why is it so important to maintain that power and, moreover, to leverage the threat to judicial independence in the process?

The reason that this is a dangerous path to follow is because judicial independence isimportant, and is particularly important in a country like Israel. There is a reason that this initiative has reached its current height (or depth) following Supreme Court decisions to strike down laws, on three separate occasions, that allowed the administrative detention of asylum seekers (‘infiltrators’, in Israeli government parlance) for three years, in the original version, and up to one year, in the watered down version.

As is the case elsewhere, there are few constituencies with less political backing than asylum seekers and refugees. Therefore, targeting the court for protecting their interests carries, relatively, few political risks. Thus, it may be unsurprising that, following these decisions, a coalition of nationalist forces started to develop, to limit the court’s ability to safeguard the rights of asylum seekers. Realising that such a targeted approach may be politically feasible but legally difficult, this coalition broadened its ambition by introducing, as recently as November 2018, an amendment to the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, limiting the courts’ ability to hold a law as unconstitutional, through a variety of ‘override clause’ versions. In addition, they managed to make the appointment process of judges to the Supreme Court a highly political affair, by reducing the power of judges in the committee and by forcing through the appointment of a first, and recently – a second, judge who live in a settlement in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

These factions, who are advocating reform, care very little about high minded matters of separation of powers. They are not bothered, and are probably not aware, of the cases that concern property rights, social security or taxation in which the court has struck down primary legislation. They want to send the court a very low-minded political message: if you want to preserve your powers, you need to align by our nationalist agenda. In a recent visit to Israel, Justice Rosalie Abella Silberman, of the Canadian Supreme Court, addressed this very issue, and hit the nail on the head, saying that:

Independent judges who are not politically compliant are not anti-democratic, they are doing their job; those critics, on the other hand, who think patriotism means doing only what politicians want, are the biggest threat to Israel’s values, because they misconceive democracy as majoritarian rule.

Indeed. This is the issue. The powers of the court are numerous. Its administrative reach, which includes an overview of home office regulations, security measures, health and education guidances and a variety of government dictates, are far more important and effective in Israel’s daily struggle to maintain what is left of a core of democratic and constitutional values. True judicial independence, in other words, lies in the freedom to uphold the rule of law against forces that are growing in power, from one generation to the next. Forces that wish to obliterate minority rights and would regard the tyranny of the majority as a constitutional value.

A country that is steeped in an ongoing national and ethnic conflict since its existence, and for over 50 years – in prolonged occupation – has an uphill battle to uphold and maintain respect for human rights, particularly for Palestinian citizens and non-citizens, but also for others. Those constituencies depend on judicial independence to stand guard against calls that seek to portray them as ‘power grabbing’, ‘authoritarian’ and, indeed, enemies of the people.

If the court is dragged into the political theatre, forced to fight for its own limited power to strike down laws by leveraging the argument of judicial independence, it will lose the battle for its powers; but more importantly, it will lose the war for its own independence.

Brexit and the Voice of the People: But Which People?

Moira Dustin, Nuno Ferreira and Susan Millns

A thousand different lenses

Brexit has been debated and unpicked to exhaustion. Writing in February 2019, Brexit is beginning to feel like a bad soap opera whose scriptwriter has run out of ideas. The plot is going round in circles.

And yet, most discussions revert one way or another to sovereignty, migration and economy – all with clear nationalistic and imperialistic overtones. Debates about people or ‘the people’ seem to be at the core of these discussion, especially when it comes to migration. All such debates are implicitly or explicitly about ‘us’ and ‘them’. This binary(ies) need challenging. What is also needed is a recognition of the multiple further intersections and subgroups within these binaries of groups of people.

The term ‘people’ disguises radically different groups of individuals and their distinct interests, voices and degrees of power and security. There are people with enough legal security to remain in the UK should they wish to. There are others without, who may have to leave if/when Brexit materialises. There are those who may have to return to the UK despite preferring to reside elsewhere in the EU.

The simple step of starting to interrogate and break down the broad category of ‘people’ is greatly revealing. Undeniably, Brexit will impact very differently on different people, depending on characteristics such as socio-economic context, educational background, age, ethnicity, etc. An intersectional approach also highlights the key role gender and sexuality play in the impact of Brexit on a person.

To explore that possible impact, we have co-edited a collection – Gender and Queer Perspectives on Brexit – whose contributions unpack the various ways in which gender and sexuality may determine how Brexit will affect the lives of people in the UK and elsewhere in the Europe Union (and beyond).

 

Why a gender and queer perspective?

As we highlight in the introduction to this edited collection, women and gender and sexual minorities have been marginalised throughout history, including in political debates. With that starting point, we were keen to explore how Brexit can change the equality, human rights and social justice landscape in the UK from gender and queer viewpoints. Our collection’s conclusion – unsurprisingly – was that overall Brexit is very likely to impact negatively upon women and gender and sexual minorities in a variety of ways.

Even before the Brexit referendum took place, it was already clear that this was a strongly gendered process. As Achilleos-Sarll and Martill make clear, the campaign for Britain to leave the EU and the subsequent Brexit process have been dominated by discourses of toxic masculinity, linked to language associated with deal-making and militarism, and spearheaded by elite, white males.

This has had four potential (gendered) consequences: setting the UK on the path towards a ‘harder’ Brexit; the consolidation of free-market norms and retrenchment of social policies; the diversion of attention from domestic to international distributional consequences; and the persistent under-representation of women and minority groups in politics.

In the immediate aftermath of the referendum, it also became clear that black and minority ethnic (BME) women were going to be particularly targeted by racist and Islamophobic attacks and assaults, as Gill and Ahmed discuss. This underlines the complex implications of Brexit from the perspective of gender, race, religion and class relations.

This complexity is compounded by the potential implications of Brexit on work-life balance. This is an area in which the EU has not escaped criticism, but where it has also been instrumental in shaping an agenda and creating a policy and normative framework that has enhanced the position of carers and counterbalanced the UK’s neoliberal approach. Caracciolo di Torella argues not only that leaving the EU is likely to jeopardise any achievements in this area in the UK, but that the consequences of Brexit will also be felt by the EU, thus there will be no ‘winners’.

Yet another field of gendered impact of Brexit relates to the UK’s National Health Service (NHS), specifically the health, healthcare and social care available to people with disabilities and illnesses. In this regard, Dyi Huijg situates Brexit in a context of hostility against both disabled people and migrants, and points to the role that health management plays in migration control and the gender dimension of the roles of migrant carer and patients.

Also in relation to cross-border family law one can see the gendered impact of Brexit: Walkerconsiders from a gender perspective the effect that Brexit will have on the relevant procedural rules, affecting areas such as child abduction, divorce, maintenance, domestic violence and parental responsibility. She concludes that post-Brexit there will be gaps in the law, especially in terms of enforcement of judicial orders and that there is currently no solution in these areas.

The situation, as Solanke alerts, seems to be even more dire in relation to Black British children, who may have a primary carer – most commonly a woman – without EU citizenship, and thus classify as ‘Zambrano children’ and lose access to their full rights as British and Union citizens after Brexit.

The gendered impact of Brexit is not, however, limited to women. As Iusmen argues, male unaccompanied minors may be particularly affected by Brexit, in the light of the risk that the UK will reduce children’s rights protections after leaving the EU.

Also in the field of asylum, Querton considers that leaving the EU is unlikely to immediately and significantly have an impact on decision-making in gender-related asylum claims. However, it will entail the loss of a legal framework underpinned by fundamental rights and effective remedies and may contribute to a(n even more) hostile environment towards women claiming asylum.

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, intersex, queer and other (LGBTIQ+) individuals are also very likely to suffer in specific ways as a consequence of Brexit. Danisi, Dustin and Ferreira argue that Brexit will affect SOGI minorities on a range of levels, including likely serious effects in terms of human rights and equality policy, ‘soft law’ instruments, socio-cultural environment, economic resources, regional variations within the UK and civil society vibrancy. Alertness will be required to legal and policy developments that may detrimentally affect SOGI minorities: on the one hand, in the UK, when the EU will stop working as an external ‘standards setting’ actor; on the other hand, in the EU, when the UK will stop supporting the advancement of the EU’s equality agenda.

Dunne also acknowledges how the EU – both symbolically and practically – has helped to re-shape queer intersections with law in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, he argues that, for many reasons (political and legal), Brexit is unlikely to fundamentally alter existing rights and entitlements.

Devolution has played a considerable role in Brexit debates, and has its own gendered dimension. Weldon-Johns critically examines whether there is, or could be, a distinctly Scottish perspective in the context of work-family rights post-Brexit, particularly from a gender perspective. The conclusion is that the current legal frameworks do not enable Scotland to retain continuity with EU law.

Still in relation to Scotland, Ritch explores how the independence referendum saw the establishment of new women’s organisations and networks to counteract a seeming marginalisation of women’s concerns in the official campaigns, whilst the European referendum saw limited national public engagement by women’s and other civil society organisations, and lacked a particular gender focus even in feminist spaces.

Yet, Scottish feminist policy organisations can continue to engage post-Brexit with pan-European feminist structures like the European Women’s Lobby, to campaign for relevant instruments such as the Istanbul Convention. In relation to Ireland, Galligan outlines the gendered constitutional and policy challenges of Brexit for Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, and the UK-Ireland relationship. The upshot: Brexit necessarily destabilises the hard-won gains of the peace process and will have negative consequences for political and diplomatic relationships across and between the two jurisdictions, with an inevitable impact on women.

Clearly, the greatest impact of Brexit will be internal, but that cannot erase the impact that will be felt outside the UK as well. Barrow, for example, asserts that important policy developments in the EU’s defence and security policy from a gender perspective are at risk and concludes that, whether the UK and the EU negotiate a ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ Brexit, the integration of a gender perspective in defence and security policymaking may be undermined.

Stephenson and Fontana, instead, assess the gendered impacts of the possible trade agreements that the UK will enter into post-Brexit. They focus on the implications of trade agreements for employment, for consumption and for the provision of public services.

A key model referred to throughout the Brexit debates has been Norway. Holst, Skjeie and Teigen discuss the EU influences on four core gender equality policy themes (anti-discrimination law, work-life balance, gender mainstreaming, and gender quotas for corporate boards), concluding that Norway’s affiliation status has been relevant to policy development in this area in Norway. This debunks the idea that Norway’s status leaves it immune from EU’s influence.

Anything to look forward to?

The contributors to the Gender and Queer Perspectives on Brexit collection have offered careful and nuanced analyses to several gendered and queer dimensions of the Brexit debates. There are plenty of causes for pessimism, even if the UK has always, in many respects, had ‘one foot in and one foot out’ of the EU. What the debates on Brexit have brought to light in an acute manner is that women’s and LGBTIQ+ legal and policy conquests are precarious.

Yet, even where Brexit threatens the legal, economic or social gains of women and LGBTIQ+ people, there is a strong sense of resistance and positivity about the potential for addressing some of these risks if only they are identified and publicly recognised. Moreover, this collection makes it clear that leaving the EU will not only affect women and LGBTIQ+ in the UK, but should also be a priority for feminists and LGBTQI+ campaigners across Europe.

Outside the EU, the UK will no longer influence EU law and policy to any significant extent, and this may have negative outcomes for women and LGBTIQ+ people living around the EU, if the concerns of our contributors materialise.

There is still much more to do to fully understand the gender and queer dimensions of Brexit. In particular,regional, urban-rural and socio-economic differences across the UK need addressing through a gendered or queer lens. Only a more comprehensive intersectional approach can do justice to the lived experiences of all those affected by Brexit. In the process, it is essential to highlight all relevant threats. Only then will we be able to address them, not simply with the defensive demand for no regression on rights, but also the inclusive aspiration for an expanding, rather than narrowing, of horizons.

Moira Dustin, Nuno Ferreira and Susan Millns are respectively Research Fellow, Professor and Professor at Sussex Law School and Members of the Sussex European Institute at the University of Sussex, This piece was originally published on the UACES blog.

Brexit, sexual orientation and gender identity: what about the people?

Rainbow parade

Slowly, but surely, awareness is increasing about the possible impact of Brexit on individuals who identify, or are identified as, members of minorities based on their sexual orientation or gender identity (SOGI).

After explorations of this theme by Wintemute and by usCooperCooper et al., and the Trade Union Congress all alerted people to the potentially detrimental effect that Brexit may have on SOGI minorities.

It is critical to note that these SOGI minorities are far from monolithic, and any potential impact of Brexit for them will be different at a sub-group and even at an individual level.

Broad-brush, abstract policy analyses on this theme – as on any other theme – fail to capture the essentially individual nature of the relationship between SOGI minorities and Brexit, as one of the most divisive and hotly contested topics in British society for many decades.

In this short piece, we wish to delve into that individuality, bringing to the fore just some of the voices within the ‘SOGI minorities’ umbrella and listening to their concerns, fears and hopes in relation to Brexit – both specifically related to their identity and more generally about life after Brexit.

SOGI minority voices and views on Brexit

In an attempt to record and analyse how individuals experience and understand the Brexit process, a group of researchers from the University of Sussex have commissioned a Mass Observation Project entitled ‘The EU referendum – one year on’.

Amongst the respondents to this there were three men who identify themselves as gay, whom we here identify with pseudonyms: Andy, 59, a retired social care manager, writer and life model, who lives in Glasgow and is single; Michael, 75, a retired executive, who lives in London and is single; and Peter, 36, a teacher, who lives in Newcastle-under-Lyme and is single.

The thoughts shared by these three respondents on Brexit are worth exploring for the insights they offer into some of the factors that SOGI minority individuals might find important in the Brexit debate.

All these respondents voted Remain, and were considerably critical of the referendum itself (although it is known that not all members of SOGI minorities are against Brexit).

Whilst Michael did not see the need for the referendum to start with, and Peter asserted that the campaign ‘was full of lies’, Andy considered that ‘the EU referendum was one of the most idiotic and wasteful undertakings the UK government had undertaken in many a long year. I saw it as nothing more than a charter for racism, xenophobia and English right nationalism.’

Peter shared this position by stating that although it may be true that ‘Britain is a complex and capable nation which can, and perhaps should, be able to stand alone’, this ‘pride is more a veiled form of xenophobia in many people.’

Similarly, for these respondents the relevance of immigration in the Brexit debate was patent. Peter, for example, argued that ‘the presence of EU nationals in the UK is a good thing as we need young tax payers to fund our public services. People’s objections to migration are parochial and ill-informed.’

For Michael, in particular, this debate touched him personally, as he had had a same-sex Spanish partner who lived in the UK for many decades and eventually died in the UK.

In his words, ‘[h]ad [his partner] still been alive, he would have undoubtedly have been one of the many thousands of foreign nationals worried about their future life in this country.’

The consequences of Brexit for individual rights was also reflected in the concerns expressed by Andy: ‘Those who wanted [Brexit] to happen will be greatly peeved when they realise that the streets have not returned to a picture of the 1950s.’

‘When they realise they will have to pay more for goods and receive less wages, and as their rights are stripped away and trodden on by a so called respectable face of fascism, the[y] will whinge and moan and throw bricks. Because that’s how they believe you fix a society [,] by tearing it apart.’

Fears of violence on the streets if ‘Leavers’ become seriously frustrated with the outcome of the Brexit process may not materialise, but a good degree of apprehension from both ‘Leavers’ and ‘Remainers’ with regards to the success of the Brexit process – no matter how one may define it – is certainly warranted.

This apprehension is expressed by Peter, who says that ‘we will also be affected in the UK by an upsurge in hatred and prejudice’ and ‘the British working class, and even more sadly many middle class too, has allowed itself to be duped and trapped into a cycle of blame and hatred which really only serves to benefit politicians.’

This inevitably affects SOGI minorities in the mind of Peter, as he points out that ‘the EU referendum vote has encouraged a sleeping conservative and nationalist sentiment to be awoken and given a voice’.

This worries Peter ‘as a gay man who has benefited from the liberalisation of attitudes in society and the greater care with which people often now express themselves. I do believe words have a real power and if we allow people to say what they think without restraint we will see an increase in prejudice and ignorance which will be disadvantageous to people in minority groups.’

What about all other voices?

These respondents’ voices are just an illustration of how some members of SOGI minorities see Brexit. Certainly no firm conclusions can be taken from such a limited sample, which only includes gay men and leaves out so many other SOGI minorities, such as trans individuals who are remembered and celebrated today.

And yet, all SOGI minorities stand to lose in the Brexit game.

Peter recalls a colleague-cum-friend ‘railing about the “myth” of transgender and insisting there are only two genders (…) she made the points vocally. I think this confidence to express such non-PC views has been created to an extent by the sense that Britain is going back to some former state of being.’

SOGI minorities must rally quickly and effectively if such regression is not to materialise.

By Dr Carmelo Danisi, Dr Moira Dustin and Professor Nuno Ferreira, all at the University of Sussex and members of SOGICA

Testing the untestable: The CJEU’s decision in Case C-473/16, F v Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal

NunoFerreira
Nuno Ferreira
Venturi
Denise Venturi

Seeking refuge from homophobia

Let’s start with people. Because law should be about people, not (just) about abstract notions and fuzzy values. F – a Nigerian man – escaped Nigeria and reached Hungary, where he claimed international protection on the basis of his fear of persecution in his home country on grounds of his homosexuality. The authority dealing with F’s claim – the Hungarian Immigration and Asylum Office – decided that to determine whether F was effectively gay, they needed to commission a psychological report. The report in question was based on projective personality tests, and concluded that it was not possible to corroborate the Applicant’s self-declared sexual orientation. This was all the Hungarian authorities needed to feel entitled to deny the Applicant’s claim. It is important to outline from the start four crucial aspects of this case: the report did not deny that the applicant was gay, but simply stated that it was not possible to prove it (if such a proof were at all possible); the Hungarian authorities did not find any fundamental contradiction in the Applicant’s declarations; they did not consider the principle of the benefit of the doubt (as required by para. 203-204 of the UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status); and there was no reference to the fact that same-sex activity between men is punishable in Nigeria with imprisonment of up to 14 years, or even the death penalty in the Northern Nigerian states that have adopted Sharia laws.

Against this background, F appealed against the negative decision of the Hungarian authorities, and the appeal court – the Administrative and Labour Court in Szeged – referred several questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The key point referred to the application of Article 4 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC (on the assessment of facts and circumstances, in the meantime replaced by Directive 2011/95/EU). The CJEU was asked whether this norm, in the light of Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) protecting human dignity, precludes forensic psychologists’ expert opinions based on projective personality tests from being used in asylum adjudication relating to LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex) claimants, even when such tests do not enquire about the applicants’ sexual habits and do not entail a physical examination. Should that possibility be precluded, the referring Court also asked whether asylum authorities are prevented from examining by ‘expert methods’ the truthfulness of such international protection claims.

More specifically, the CJEU was called upon to assess the use of three types of projective drawing tests to assess sexuality, namely the ‘Draw-a-Person-in-the-Rain’ test, the Rorschach test and the Szondi test. These tests are used to obtain information from ‘patients’ where they struggle or prefer not to verbalise their feelings and experiences, in this way helping psychologists to assess personality, emotional well-being and mental health. As we have discussed in a previous blog post, even if these tools are still widely used by psychologists across the world, they are generally contentious and their use to assess an individual’s sexuality has been utterly ruled out by the scientific community. As a consequence, neither the relevant literature nor reputable professionals make any use of such tests for these purposes, and the use of psychiatric and psychological evidence is generally ruled out in sexuality-related asylum cases, for example, in the UK. The fact that the Hungarian Institute of Forensic Experts and Investigators produced a report stating that such tests did not prejudice human dignity and were appropriate – along with a ‘suitable exploration’ of the issues – to indicate an individual’s sexual orientation (see par. 25 of CJEU decision), is an indictment on the professional credibility of the individuals involved in producing the report. Yet, this was not the first time the CJEU has been confronted with highly dubious means of evidence in asylum cases involving sexuality.

Worrying signs

The CJEU has had three opportunities so far to deal with sexual orientation asylum claims. The first opportunity was in the joined cases C-199/12 to C-201/12, X, Y and Z v. Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel, which positively outlawed the ‘discretion requirement’, in other words, the possibility of returning asylum claimants to their countries of origin on the basis that they can be ‘discreet’ about their sexual orientation. On a more negative note, however, the Court also determined that for the ‘particular social group’ ground of the 1951 Refugee Convention to be used in such cases, sexual orientation asylum applicants need to fulfil two tests: membership of a group socially recognisable in the country of origin (social recognition test) and recognition of sexual identity as a characteristic so fundamental to a person’s identity that one should not have to renounce to it (fundamental characteristic test). The Court also determined that the criminalization of same-sex conduct does not in itself constitute an act of persecution. Both these points reflect a strict interpretation of EU law that runs against the UNHCR guidelines and commentators’ views.

In the second sexual orientation asylum case brought before the CJEU, the Court deals more explicitly with evidentiary standards: in Joined Cases C-148/13 to C-150/13, A, B and C v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2 December 2014, the CJEU asserted that the sexual orientation declared by asylum applicants ‘constitute[s], having regard to the particular context in which the applications for asylum are made, merely the starting point in the process of assessment of the facts and circumstances’, thus endorsing authorities’ desire to subject asylum applicant’s self-declared sexual orientation to close scrutiny. Although some European Union (EU) Member States circumvent that matter by generally accepting asylum applicants self-declared sexuality, many others are eager – like Hungary in the F case – to closely scrutinise applicants’ self-declared sexual orientation, disbelieve it wherever possible and thus find an easy route to deny the asylum claim. In A, B and C, the Court appropriately refused the use of sexualised evidence or stereotyped assessments in sexual orientation asylum claims, thus precluding medical tests such as phallometric testing and explanation of sexual practices on the basis that the use of ‘evidence’ of this nature violates the dignity and privacy of the claimants (Articles 1 and 7 of the EU Charter). Yet, no positive guidance was offered as to what questions are appropriate in these circumstances. Moreover, questions based on stereotypes may still be asked, as part of overall balanced lines of questioning, thus still leaving much room for ambiguity and opening the door for inappropriate interviewing and decision-making.

The F case brought the matter of sexual orientation asylum claims back into the EU arena and offered the Court an opportunity to improve some of the shortcomings of its two previous decisions on this type of claim. Whether or not the Court would use this opportunity effectively was far from obvious. Indeed, despite recognising that a psychologist cannot determine an applicant’s sexual orientation based on personality tests, AG Wahl argued in his Opinion in this case that the tests in question should be admitted, provided that consent is obtained and the tests carried out in a way that is compatible with the rights to dignity and to respect for private and family life (Articles 1 and 7 of the EU Charter). AG Wahl effectively offered EU Member States an unreasonably wide margin of appreciation and an alarming scope to use ‘fake science’ to undermine asylum applicant’s claims, which deserved our outright criticism. Would the Court do any better?

Third time lucky indeed

In its judgment, the CJEU went further than the AG Wahl’s Opinion suggested and offered a much more cogent statement on the inappropriateness of using projective personality tests in sexual orientation asylum cases. The CJEU adhered to the position defended in A, B and C in terms of applicants’ statements being simply the starting point in the process of assessing the facts and circumstances of an international protection claim, which means that an applicant’s self-identification as LGBTI may be subject to scrutiny as well (para. 28-29). Yet, the Court seems to have tried to offer a bolder position than in its previous decisions.

First, the Court highlights that, according to Article 10(2) of Directive 2011/95/EU, actually possessing the characteristic that allows an applicant to be considered a member of a particular social group (PSG) for the purposes of the international protection claim is, in fact, immaterial, as what matters is that such a characteristic be attributed to that applicant by the actor of persecution (par. 31). What is interesting in this is the emphasis the Court places on this point, which had not been explicitly raised by the referring Court or in the AG’s Opinion and was not strictly relevant in this context. This is a welcome move by the Court, as it stressed that to establish a PSG the characteristic may simply be attributed to the person by the actor of persecution, and not necessarily be possessed by that person. This reading is in line with the spirit of the 1951 Convention and with UNHCR guidance, as provided in its Handbook (par. 66) and Guidelines No. 9 (para. 39 and 41). In the decision under comment, the Court referred to this point to argue that it is not always necessary to assess an applicant’s sexual orientation when dealing with sexual orientation cases – as it would be the case when the non-heterosexual orientation is only perceived/attributed (par. 32). Hence, at the beginning of its reasoning, the Court seems to be sending the message that tests aiming to assess an applicant’s sexual orientation are neither necessarily useful nor can they be used as a ‘magic wand’ to solve asylum cases.

Second, the Court accepts that Article 4(3) of Directive 2011/95/EU does not restrict the use of expert reports in the assessment of the facts and circumstances, but in line with the decision in A, B and C, it also places special emphasis on respect for Article 1 (human dignity), Article 7 (right to respect for private and family life) and Article 47 (right to an effective remedy) of the EU Charter(para. 34-35 and 43). As the Court specifies, this requires that national authorities adapt their methods of assessment to each category of application, including the type of Country of Origin Information (COI) it produces or procures (para. 37-38). Crucially, and contradicting explicitly the position taken by the Hungarian referring court, this also requires national authorities to take ultimate responsibility for the individual assessment of facts and circumstances, rather than (dis)placing that burden on experts (para. 40-42).

Third, the Court addressed head on the issue of consent. When commenting on the AG’s Opinion in this case, we had argued that the CJEU would have to explain how applicants’ genuine consent in such circumstances could be guaranteed, in the light of the inevitable pressure under which applicants must feel to undergo any tests deemed by national authorities as useful, even if not compulsory. We are very pleased to see that the Court has indeed questioned the genuinely free nature of consent from applicants under these circumstances (para. 52-53).

Fourth, in the light of the previous points, the Court considered that such tests constitute an unjustifiable and disproportionate interference with the Applicant’s right to respect for private life and are thus precluded by EU law. This is the case especially owing to the lack of reliability of such tests, the particularly serious interference with private life they entail and their non-essential nature (para. 54-65). It is interesting that to strengthen its argumentation – and similarly to the AG in his Opinion – the Court also relied on Principle 18 of the Yogyakarta Principles (protecting individuals from medical abuses based on sexual orientation or gender identity) (par. 62), which reinforces the legitimacy and legal authority of this tool in sexual orientation related litigation. The CJEU thus points out that national authorities would do better to focus on ensuring that asylum case workers have the necessary training and skills for themselves to assess all personal circumstances pertaining to each case, including sexual orientation matters (para. 66-67).

Importantly, in the light of Article 4(5) of Directive 2011/95/EU, the Court highlights that even in the absence of evidence, an applicant’s statements regarding their sexuality may not need confirmation, especially if the applicant’s statement is consistent and plausible (the provision in question also making reference to the applicant’s ‘genuine effort to substantiate his application’, a ‘satisfactory explanation ha[ving] been given regarding any lack of other relevant elements’, the ‘applicant ha[ving] applied for international protection at the earliest possible time’, and ‘the general credibility of the applicant ha[ving] been established’) (par. 68). Although this still falls short of relying on applicants’ sexual self-identification and makes no explicit reference to the principle of the benefit of the doubt (para. 203-204 of the UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines), such emphasis on an applicant’s overall credibility reflects a genuine and positive effort from the CJEU to promote fair and lawful asylum decision-making procedures at the hands of national authorities.

A light at the end of the tunnel?

In a nutshell, the Court’s message is that it is acceptable for national authorities to commission expert reports in asylum cases related to sexual orientation, but the tests in question in the F case should be precluded. The overall tone of the decision is – we argue – more positive towards asylum seekers persecuted on grounds of their sexual orientation than past decisions of the CJEU have been. One could thus be tempted to think that the idiom ‘third time lucky’ applies here. We share that positive reading of this judgment. Yet, we would also like to point out that, once more, the Court did not offer any positive guidance as to how authorities should deal with evidentiary standards in this context and failed to recognise the importance of self-declared sexual orientation. At the same time, it must be noted that the CJEU preliminary rulings function through requests referred by domestic courts and the CJEU is thus bound by the questions asked by the referring court (although the Court has taken, in certain instances, a more proactive approach: see, e.g. Abdida). Therefore, one way to instigate greater clarity is for domestic courts to shape the questions they refer to the CJEU in a way that allows the Luxembourg judges to actually give positive guidance. On another note, the current CJEU jurisprudence on sexual orientation asylum cases and its related future jurisprudence have the effect of drawing clear lines between what does and what does not respect human rights. This is to say that, little by little, article by article of the EU Charter, the CJEU is indeed shaping the boundaries of sexual orientation asylum cases in the EU asylum acquis.

The best way forward to improve the way sexual orientation asylum claims are decided seems to entail the combination of a series of legislative amendments with a three-pronged non-legislative strategy: training, guidance and quality control. First, much better training needs to be offered to decision-makers who deal with sexual orientation asylum claims. Only appropriately qualified decision-makers who benefit from high-quality training in the field of gender and sexuality will be able to deconstruct and resist stereotyped and Euro/Western-centric views of how a credible asylum claimant should present their story involving persecution on grounds of sexual orientation, and what means of evidence are appropriate in such instances. As for the training, given that the topic is indeed complex and requires a high level of expertise, the focus should not be on its quantity and content (although regular, comprehensive and multidisciplinary training is undoubtedly useful), but rather, perhaps, on methodologies and means of training. In particular, we believe that training on sexual orientation and gender identity asylum claims would benefit from the input of refugee and LGBTQI+ groups more familiar with the issues in question. Moreover, the participation of LGBTQI+ refugees in training curricula could be envisaged at different stages, such as in designing such training courses. Listening to the voices of yesterday’s refugees can help us address more effectively the needs of today’s refugees. Second, comprehensive, effective and readily available guidance needs to be produced and disseminated, as to reach all domestic authorities dealing with sexual orientation cases. Key principles and positive guidance (but not prescriptive lists of questions) need to be established covering what aspects should be discussed, how such interviews should be conducted, and what means of evidence a decision-maker should use. Finally, a reliable and impartial quality control system needs to be put in place, to allow the quick identification of inappropriate evidentiary practices and introduction of improvements. In short, much work still needs to be carried out by domestic asylum authorities, that at an institutional and individual level, consciously or unconsciously, still resist improvements and perpetuate harmful practices. An arduous, but essential body of work lies ahead.

Nuno Ferreira is a Professor of Law at the University of Sussex and SOGICA’s project leader. Denise Venturi is a PhD Student in International Law and Human Rights at Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna and KU Leuven. The authors wish to thank the useful comments provided by Carmelo Danisi, Moira Dustin and Nina Held on previous drafts of this text. This post first appeared on the EDAL – European Database of Asylum Law blog